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I.   INTRODUCTION 
I have but one lamp by which my feet are guided, and that is 
the lamp of experience. I know no way of judging the future 
but by the past.1
My interest is in the future because I am going to spend the 
rest of my life there.2
                                                                                                                    
 * J.D., Florida State University College of Law, May 2007. The author would like to 
thank Rick Sites, Dr. Greg Mitchell, Shoshana Green, Tom Fitzpatrick IV, and the Florida 
State University Law Review staff for suggestions on this Comment.  The author would 
also like to thank Benjamin Priester for his comments on a prior draft.  The author wel-
comes discussion at BrianSites@comcast.net. 
 1. Unknown, FBI Futures Working Group, Futures Working Group Members: Quot-
ables, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/td/fwg/quotables.htm (last visited July 2, 2007). 
 2. Charles F. Kettering, quoted at The Quotations Page, 
http://www.quotationspage.com/quote/11322.html (last visited July 2, 2007). 
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 In spite of thousands of years of science, humankind is distinctly 
unable to predict the future. And yet, the judicial system is called 
upon to do just so daily. In bail considerations, judges predict flight 
risk. In parole hearings, officials contemplate the likelihood of re-
offense. And in three states, a defendant convicted of a capital crime 
will live or die based on what a judge and jury thinks he will do in an 
unknown future.3 It has been observed that “what separates the exe-
cutioner from the murderer is the legal process by which the state 
ascertains and condemns those guilty of heinous crimes. If that proc-
ess is flawed . . . the legitimacy of our legal process is threatened.”4 
When states execute based in part on the defendant’s future actions, 
the legal process is confronted with several complex questions. If 
they cannot be satisfactorily answered, the state risks collapsing the 
distinction between murderer and executioner. 
 This Comment collects and responds to several of the strongest 
arguments—stemming from both constitutional objections and more 
general concerns—against the use of future dangerousness as a con-
sideration in death penalty sentencing.  Following this Introduction, 
Part II provides definitions and basic background information on fu-
ture dangerousness. Part III compares the use of clinical methods to 
actuarial methods for determining future dangerousness and advo-
cates for the conclusion reached by other commentators that actuar-
ial methods are preferable. It also briefly reviews the Violence Risk 
Appraisal Guide (VRAG) and the Classification of Violence Risk 
(COVR) software, two actuarial tools referenced by example through-
out this Comment. Part IV reviews the case law history of future 
dangerousness and the death penalty. On the foundation laid by 
Parts III and IV, Part V collects and responds to six of the most po-
tent objections to future dangerousness: (1) relevance and admissibil-
ity of evidence, (2) the requirement of an individualized assessment, 
(3) reliance on factors that do not index blameworthiness, (4) vague-
ness challenges, (5) predestination considerations, and (6) objections 
to future dangerousness as nonretributive. Part VI considers general-
ized and specific arguments for the use of future dangerousness tes-
timony. Part VII makes several specific suggestions as to how future 
dangerousness evidence should be used by courts. Part VIII con-
cludes with general comments. 
II.   SOME QUICK DEFINITIONS 
 “Future dangerousness” refers to the prediction of whether an in-
dividual in the criminal justice system will commit a violent crime in 
 
 3. OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150 (2007); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN art. 37.071 § 2(e)(1) 
(Vernon 2007); VA. CODE. ANN. § 19.2-264.4 (2007). 
 4. Flores v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 456, 469-70 (5th Cir. 2000) (Garza, J., concurring). 
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the future.5 Future dangerousness is ultimately a yes-or-no decision, 
and juries are restricted to concluding that the defendant is or is not 
a future danger; “maybe” is not an option.6 However, the evidence 
that informs this decision is rarely black and white: often it involves 
conflicting expert opinions and competing risk assessments cast in 
shades of grey. A “risk assessment” involves the use of clinical, actu-
arial, or physiological methods to determine the probability that an 
individual will commit a violent crime in the future. Risk assess-
ments return a percentage chance that a given defendant will com-
mit a violent crime in the future. They are thus somewhat analogous 
to when weather forecasts give a percentage chance that certain 
weather will occur in the future.7  
 Using risk assessments (or other future dangerousness evidence 
presented), juries decide the larger, normative aspect of a future 
dangerousness decision: how much risk is sufficient to conclude that 
the defendant will be a future danger to society? In other words, if a 
risk assessment expert testifies that there is a 52% chance that a de-
fendant will commit a crime in the future, the jury must decide if 
that chance is “enough” under the applicable law. It is presumed that 
a jury can reach this conclusion without any explicit assistance, but 
often expert witnesses are called on to give opinions or findings based 
on different risk assessment methods. Thus, while a future danger-
ousness consideration is partially empirical, it is primarily normative 
as juries are asked to determine whether the empirical component 
compels the decision that the person is, in fact, a future danger.8
III.   THE EMPIRICAL: CLINICAL AND ACTUARIAL METHODS 
 When mental health professionals testify as to whether a defen-
dant is a future danger, several methods are available. These meth-
ods fall into two general categories: clinical methods that rely on the 
subjective judgment of mental health professionals and actuarial 
methods that rely on structured scoring tools and statistics.9 Both 
 
 5. For a discussion of what should be defined as a “violent crime,” see Grant H. Mor-
ris, Defining Dangerousness: Risking a Dangerous Definition, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL 
ISSUES 61, 72 (1999). For a comprehensive analysis of future dangerous predictions and 
methodology, see generally VERNON L. QUINSEY ET AL., VIOLENT OFFENDERS: APPRAISING 
AND MANAGING RISK (2d ed. 2006). 
 6. See OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150 (2007); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN art. 37.071 
(Vernon 2007); VA. CODE. ANN. § 19.2-264.4 (2007). 
 7. See John Monahan & Henry J. Steadman, Violent Storms and Violent People: How 
Meteorology Can Inform Risk Communication in Mental Health Law, 51 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 931, 935-37 (1996). 
 8.  For a discussion of the empirical and normative components of a future danger-
ous decision, see Aletha Claussen-Schulz et al., Dangerousness, Risk Assessment, and 
Capital Sentencing, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 471, 484-85 (2004). 
 9. Physiological methods also ostensibly exist, but research on them is thus far 
scarce and therefore they are not considered in this Comment. 
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clinical and actuarial models have been criticized,10 but studies now 
generally support the validity of at least some actuarial tools.11 This 
Part briefly reviews some of the findings on both clinical and actuar-
ial methods and agrees, based on these findings and practical consid-
erations, with the consensus of current literature that actuarial 
methods are greatly preferable.  
A.   Clinical Methods 
 Clinical methods take several forms. A mental health professional 
might interview a patient, examine his criminal record, talk with his 
friends and family, or even, in extreme cases, base the future dan-
gerousness prediction only on the fact pattern of the defendant’s 
crime, as related to him at trial.12 The mental health professional re-
lies on any of a number of factors in making a clinical future danger-
ousness determination. The core feature of this method is that the 
determination is based on the experience and intuition of the profes-
sional in an unstructured format; the clinician determines what is 
important to consider in reaching his or her conclusion. 
 The greatest weakness of clinical methods is that they rely on the 
subjective analysis of individual mental health professionals. Several 
studies have shown that people make a variety of “systematic and 
gross errors”13 when asked to make predictions, and mental health 
professionals are prone to the same mistakes.14 Since the early 
1980s, studies have shown that when mental health professionals 
make predictions about future dangerousness based on clinical 
methods, they are wrong much of the time.15 Clinical assessment is 
also problematic because it does not lend itself easily to any review or 
 
 10. See, e.g., Thomas R. Litwack, Actuarial Versus Clinical Assessments of Danger-
ousness, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 409 (2001) (arguing evidence does not support the 
conclusion that actuarial methods are superior to clinical methods); John Monahan, A Ju-
risprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm Among Prisoners, Predators, and Pa-
tients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 406-07 (2006). 
 11. See, e.g., QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 5, at 141-69. 
 12. Dr. James Grigson, discussed infra Part V.B, is the most infamous example of a 
mental health professional utilizing this practice. 
 13. See QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 5, at 61. For a discussion of several of these errors, 
see id. at 61-62. 
 14. See Lewis R. Goldberg, Simple Models or Simple Processes?: Some Research on 
Clinical Judgments, 23 AM. PSYCHOLGIST 483, 484-85 (1968). 
 15. Compare Charles W. Lidz et al., The Accuracy of Predictions of Violence to Others, 
269 JAMA 1007 (1993) (setting forth a study which showed that 53% of patients predicted 
to be violent later committed a violent act during the six-month follow-up period, while 
36% of patients predicted to be safe later committed a violent act), with Diana Sepejak et 
al., Clinical Predictions of Dangerousness: Two Year Follow-Up of 408 Pre-Trial Forensic 
Cases, 11 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 171 (1983) (setting forth a study which 
showed that 39% of defendants rated to have a “medium” or “high” likelihood of future vio-
lence committed a violent act during the two-year follow-up period, while 26% rated to 
have a “low” likelihood of future violence committed a violent act in the follow-up period). 
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validation process. Because each clinician is relying on her own sub-
jective method of clinical analysis, it is difficult to determine her ac-
curacy—there are not likely to be articles on Dr. Jane’s particular 
subjective method. The individual clinician is also unlikely to know 
how accurate she is, especially in criminal predictions of future dan-
gerousness. Unless she keeps track of the defendant’s subsequent 
criminal history or lack thereof, she will receive no feedback on her 
prediction. 
 These problems lead to a substantial variance in the quality of 
clinical predictions. The situation is compounded by the fact that, be-
cause individual professionals are often unaware of even their own 
capabilities, courts may be unable to identify qualified professionals. 
Even assuming there are highly skilled clinical predictors—and stud-
ies suggest there are few—the court’s inability to identify them re-
sults in a game of expert witness Russian roulette: if a poor clinician 
is in the chambers, the result for the defendant is likely death. 
 Finally, even assuming there exist highly skilled clinical predic-
tors and it is a skilled predictor who testifies, the jury has no evalua-
tive tools to determine if the expert is, in fact, correct. If, for example, 
there is conflicting expert testimony and the highly skilled predictor 
is inarticulate, her opinion may be disregarded in favor of a less ca-
pable, but charismatic opposing expert. The jury has no way to con-
front the methods objectively. Thus, based on practical difficulties, 
clinical assessments are suboptimal measuring tools. 
B.   Actuarial Methods 
 Actuarial methods involve structured assessments in which the 
mental health professional follows some set of instructions to deter-
mine the defendant’s risk of being a future danger. One such tool is 
the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide (VRAG), developed in 1993 and 
verified repeatedly since then.16 Researchers created the VRAG 
based on assessments of over 600 men at the maximum-security Oak 
Ridge psychiatric hospital in Ontario, Canada.17 Its creators began 
with fifty variables obtained from institutional files and used statis-
tical analysis to narrow the list down to the twelve most predictive 
variables—those currently included in the VRAG.18 The twelve 
VRAG factors are: whether the defendant lived with both biological 
 
 16. See Grant T. Harris et al., Violent Recidivism of Mentally Disordered Offenders: 
The Development of a Statistical Prediction Instrument, 20 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 315 
(1993). However, the VRAG was not referred to as such until 1995. See also 
http://www.mhcp-research.com/ragpage.htm for additional information on the VRAG’s his-
tory and http://www.mhcp-research.com/ragreps.htm for information on known replica-
tions of the VRAG. 
 17. QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 5, at 144; Monahan, supra note 10, at 409-10. 
 18. See QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 5, at 141-47. 
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parents until age sixteen, elementary school maladjustment, history 
of alcohol problems, marital status, nonviolent criminal history, fail-
ure on a prior conditional release (such as bail, probation, parole, et 
cetera), age, seriousness of victim injury for the index offense, 
whether there was a female victim, the presence of a personality dis-
order, the presence of schizophrenia, and a Psychopathy Checklist 
score.19 The presence or absence of each variable corresponds with a 
point value (+1, -2, +5, et cetera), and the total of these point values 
places the defendant into one of nine risk categories, each with a cor-
responding probability of violent recidivism.20 These probabilities, at 
seven and ten years in the future, are produced in the table below.21
VRAG 
Category 
Percentage 
Scoring in 
Range 
VRAG Score 7 years 10 years 
1 2 ≤ -22 0 0.08 
2 11 -21 to -15 0.08 0.10 
3 17 -14 to -8 0.12 0.24 
4 17 -7 to -1 0.17 0.31 
5 19 0 to + 6 0.35 0.48 
6 15 + 7 to + 13 0.44 0.58 
7 12 +14 to +20 0.55 0.64 
8 6 +21 to +27 0.76 0.82 
9 1 ≥ +28 1.00 1.00 
 Actuarial methods have recently come into increasing favor 
among mental health professionals22 and have been shown to be 
more accurate and reliable than clinical measures.23 New tools are 
constantly in development; one of the newer actuarial methods, de-
veloped in the MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study, is the 
Classification of Violence Risk (COVR) software.24 This software, 
                                                                                                                    
 19. See id. at 237-38.
 20. See id. at 147-48, 237-40. 
 21. Table adapted from id., app. A at 240 and app. C at 245. 
 22. Id. 
 23. William M. Grove & Paul E. Meehl, Comparative Efficiency of Informal (Subjec-
tive, Impressionistic) and Formal (Mechanical, Algorithmic) Prediction Procedures: The 
Clinical-Statistical Controversy, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 293, 298 (1996) (describing 
how only 8 of 136 studies comparing clinical to actuarial methods found clinical methods to 
be more accurate).
 24. See John Monahan et al., An Actuarial Model of Violence Risk Assessment for Per-
sons with Mental Disorders, 56 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 810 (2005) [hereinafter Monahan 
et al., An Actuarial Model], available at http://psychservices.psychiatryonline.org/cgi/ 
reprint/56/7/810; see also MacArthur Research Network on Mental Health & the Law, 
The MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment: Executive Summary, 
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validated and released in 2005, relies on a “classification tree” to con-
sider several different combinations of risk factors and places par-
ticipants into one of five risk classes.25 The software was designed by 
assessing over 1,000 patients in acute civil psychiatric facilities on 
134 potential risk factors and then following the patients for twenty 
weeks after discharge from the psychiatric hospital.26 Most of the pa-
tients assessed fell into the lower risk categories instead of the 
higher; 36.5% were in the lowest risk category while only 6.7% were 
in the highest.27 The resulting rate of violence for each class during 
the twenty weeks after release was 1.2% for the lowest risk category, 
7.7% for the next lowest, 26.2% for the middle category, 55.9% for the 
second highest category, and 76.2% for the highest category.28 Thus, 
violence was highly concentrated in the highest risk classes. 
 Actuarial methods are not free from the concerns raised in Part 
III.A, supra, regarding clinical methods, but the risk of errors going 
undetected is much smaller. Just as experts are prone to making 
mistakes in clinical predictions, it is also possible that professionals 
administering actuarial methods will err, perhaps by inaccurate scor-
ing or misunderstanding the results. But the adversarial system is 
designed to address these possibilities through review by opposing 
counsel’s experts and by cross-examination. Since actuarial tools are 
transparent and standardized, these errors are easier to catch. Thus, 
even if the court is confronted with an unskilled expert, it will have 
several evaluative tools at its disposal to examine the interview find-
ings, how the expert scored the test, what the literature says those 
scores mean, and so on. If the court does not catch the errors itself, 
the opposing counsel’s expert will have a chance to testify as to the 
inaccuracies. If neither the court nor opposing counsel recognizes 
that the expert has erred, the jury at least has at its disposal objec-
tive, scientific means and standards to determine the accuracy of the 
expert’s methodology.29  
 
http://www.macarthur.virginia.edu/risk.html (last visited July 2, 2007). For a summary of 
the main findings of the MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study, see generally JOHN 
MONAHAN ET AL., RETHINKING RISK ASSESSMENT: THE MACARTHUR STUDY OF MENTAL 
DISORDER AND VIOLENCE (2001) [hereinafter MONAHAN ET AL., RETHINKING RISK 
ASSESSMENT]. 
 25. Monahan et al., An Actuarial Model, supra note 24, at 810. 
 26. Monahan, supra note 10, at 411-12. For a list of the risk factors, see John 
Monahan et al., Developing a Clinically Useful Actuarial Tool for Assessing Violence Risk, 
176 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 312, 313-15 tbl. 1 (2000).  
 27. See MONAHAN ET AL., RETHINKING RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 24, at 126.
 28. See id. at 125 tbl. 6.7. 
 29. That is not to say that a jury’s task in evaluating such testimony is easy. How-
ever, actuarial tools offer the jury a chance to evaluate the expert’s findings, a chance that 
clinical assessment generally do not provide.  
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IV.   THE NORMATIVE: THE HISTORY OF THE DEATH PENALTY AND 
FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS 
A.   The Death Penalty 
 In the 1972 case of Furman v. Georgia,30 the Supreme Court held 
that statutes which offered juries no guidance on what to consider in 
death penalty sentencing were unconstitutional.31 Because they led 
to arbitrary and capricious impositions of the death penalty, such 
statutes violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.32 In part 
because five concurring opinions were filed in the case,33 Furman 
was widely received as confusing, and states responded to the ruling 
in a variety of ways.34 Some states specified in detail how the jury 
was to consider the imposition of death35 while others removed the 
jury’s discretion entirely.36 The variety of modifications and the di-
versity of statutes set the stage for reconsideration by the Supreme 
Court. 
 In Gregg v. Georgia,37 the Court upheld Georgia’s revised statute 
because it allowed the jury to exercise discretion and provided statu-
tory guidelines.38 In particular, it specified consideration of statutory 
mitigating and aggravating circumstances.39 Under Georgia’s stat-
ute, the death penalty was unlikely to be “wantonly and freakishly” 
imposed.40 But how would other states fare? 
 On the same day it decided Furman, the Court also decided 
Woodson v. North Carolina.41 Unlike Georgia, North Carolina had at-
tempted to comply with Furman by removing jury discretion and 
mandating the death penalty in first degree murder convictions.42 
The Woodson Court struck down the North Carolina statute because 
it did not “replac[e] arbitrary and wanton jury discretion with objec-
tive standards.”43 In other words, the Court wanted guided discre-
tion, not no discretion at all. The Court also said that “[w]hile the 
prevailing practice of individualizing sentencing determinations gen-
 
 30. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 31. See id. at 239-40; id. at 253, 255-58 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 32. See id. at 239-40 (per curiam). 
 33. Id. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 257 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 306 
(Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310 (White, J., concurring); id. at 314 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 34. See Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: The Paradox of 
Today’s Arbitrary and Mandatory Capital Punishment Scheme, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
345, 352-53 (1998). 
 35. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 163-66 (1976). 
 36. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 286 (1976). 
 37. 428 U.S. 153. 
 38. Id. at 206-07. 
 39. Id. at 196-98. 
 40. Id. at 206-07. 
 41. 428 U.S. 280. 
 42. Id. at 286-87. 
 43. Id. at 303. 
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erally reflects simply enlightened policy rather than a constitutional 
imperative . . . in capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity 
underlying the Eighth Amendment . . . requires [individualized sen-
tencing].”44 The Court emphasized that the severity and uniqueness 
of the death penalty required an increased level of “reliability in the 
determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific 
case.”45 Mandatory death sentences removed jury discretion and 
failed this standard. 
 Yet another case decided with Furman and Woodson was Jurek v. 
Texas,46 a case that helped to ignite the current future dangerous-
ness debate. The Texas statute at issue required the jury to consider 
three special questions, the second of which involved future danger-
ousness.47 Because the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had read 
into the future dangerousness question the possibility for the defen-
dant to bring to the jury’s attention any mitigating circumstances, 
the Supreme Court held that the Texas statute was constitutional.48 
Although the discretion that Texas allowed juries to exercise was 
narrow and formulaic, it was likely to lead to the consistent and pre-
dictable imposition of the death penalty.49
B.   Future Dangerousness 
 Seven years later, the Supreme Court decided Barefoot v. 
Estelle.50 If Jurek kindled the future dangerousness fire, Barefoot 
poured on the kerosene by addressing the issue of expert witness tes-
timony on future dangerousness. In Barefoot, the Court held that a 
Texas district court had not erred in admitting psychiatric testimony 
on future dangerousness.51 During the sentencing phase, two State 
experts testified that the defendant was likely to be dangerous in the 
future.52 One expert, psychiatrist Dr. James Grigson, even testified 
that he was “100% sure” the defendant was going to repeat offend.53 
Neither expert had examined the defendant, and both expert opin-
ions were based primarily on a lengthy hypothetical question posed 
by the State in court.54
 Despite criticism from the American Psychiatric Association 
 
 44. Id. at 304. 
 45. Id. at 305. 
 46. 428 U.S. 262 (1976). 
 47. See id. at 269. 
 48. Id. at 276. Texas’ statute now specifically provides an additional question on miti-
gating circumstances. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. 37.071 § 2(e)(1) (Vernon 2007). 
 49. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 276.  
 50. 463 U.S. 880 (1983). 
 51. Id. at 905-06. 
 52. Id. at 884. 
 53. Id. at 905 n.11. 
 54. Id. at 917-19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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(APA) in its amicus brief that psychiatrists were unable to accurately 
predict future dangerousness, the majority held that psychiatrists 
were accurate enough to pass constitutional muster.55 The Court was 
confident that the adversarial system would reveal inaccuracies in 
testimony and that juries would be able to sort out the truth.56 Over two 
fierce dissents, the Court upheld the use of psychiatric testimony on fu-
ture dangerousness because it was not “entirely unreliable”57—despite 
the APA’s contention that it was wrong “two times out of three.”58
 Although Barefoot has been heavily criticized,59 it has not been 
overruled, and courts have continued to admit the testimony of men-
tal health professionals. Some commentators have argued, however, 
that the 1993 case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.60 
modified the criteria for admitting expert testimony in criminal sen-
tencing.61 In Daubert, Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, 
“echo[ed] the language of his dissent in Barefoot”62 and overruled the 
existing “general acceptance” test from Frye v. United States63 for 
admitting expert witness testimony.64
 Daubert, a federal civil case about birth defects caused by a morn-
ing sickness drug, identified a four-factor review for the admission of 
expert testimony.65 The review requires consideration of four “gen-
eral observations,” a list of nonexclusive factors a judge is to consider 
in determining whether to admit the testimony into evidence.66 
Unlike the narrow Frye test, Daubert’s four factors permit a more 
comprehensive review of the basis of the testimony. The four factors 
are: (1) testability (both whether the scientific methodology can be 
tested and whether it actually has been tested), (2) whether the 
methodology has been subjected to peer review, (3) the existence of 
methodological standards and the rate of error, and (4) general ac-
 
 55. Id. at 899 (majority opinion). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 916 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 59. See, e.g., Thomas Regnier, Barefoot in Quicksand: The Future of “Future Danger-
ousness” Predictions in Death Penalty Sentencing in the World of Daubert and Kumho, 37 
AKRON L. REV. 469, 469-70 (2004). 
 60. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 61. See Erica Beecher-Monas, The Epistemology of Prediction: Future Dangerousness 
Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 353, 367-69 (2003); Reg-
nier, supra note 59, at 493-95.  
 62. Eugenia T. La Fontaine, Note, A Dangerous Preoccupation with Future Danger: 
Why Expert Predictions of Future Dangerousness in Capital Cases Are Unconstitutional, 44 
B.C. L. REV. 207, 226 (2002). 
 63. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The Frye test only 
allowed entry of evidence that had gained “general acceptance” in the relevant scientific 
field. Id. 
 64. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588-89. 
 65. See id. at 593-94. 
 66. See id. at 593-95. 
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ceptance of the methodology in the field.67 If the testimony fails every 
factor or is otherwise not relevant, the judge should exclude it.68 Act-
ing in this manner, the judge functions as a gatekeeper, allowing 
only reliable and relevant information to reach the jury.69   
C.   A Future Dangerousness Standard? 
 How does Daubert affect future dangerousness testimony? While 
it expressly overruled the existing standard for the admission of ex-
pert testimony in federal cases, Daubert, a federal case, does not ap-
ply to state criminal cases or to federal or state sentencing proceed-
ings.70 There are several reasons, however, why applying Daubert’s 
“general observations” to sentencing proceedings would be logical.  
 Because death is an absolute and severe punishment, allowing the 
admission of relevant information during the sentencing stage is 
paramount.71 Since Daubert’s review is broad, it encourages the ad-
mission of relevant information. Courts also require that evidence used 
to weigh a decision as severe as execution be reliable.72 Daubert encour-
ages a thorough review of the methods, and by excluding irrelevant or 
baseless testimony, a judge using Daubert protects reliability. 
 Given that “death is different”73 than other sentences due to its 
severity and irreversibility, courts should have comprehensive ad-
missibility guidelines that ensure the decision to impose death is 
well-informed. Put more directly, if proceedings where death is not 
contemplated require the thorough Daubert standard, proceedings 
that contemplate the more severe punishment of execution should 
logically require a review standard with at least the same level of 
caution. Some states, such as Texas, have recognized this argument 
and essentially adopted Daubert.74 While the Supreme Court has not 
addressed this position, this Comment proceeds on the assertion that 
Daubert should apply in death penalty proceedings.75
 
 67. See id. at 593-94. 
 68. See id. at 592-95. 
 69. See id. at 597. 
 70. See FED. R. EVID. 1101(d)(3); Flores v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 456, 464 n.10 (5th Cir. 
2000) (Garza, J., concurring) (“It is well settled that, in the federal courts, the rules of evi-
dence generally do not apply at a sentencing hearing, even one in which the death penalty 
is a possibility.”); see also G. Michael Fenner, The Daubert Handbook: The Case, Its Essen-
tial Dilemma, and Its Progeny, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 939, 974 (1996). 
 71. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190 (1976). 
 72. See Beecher-Monas, supra note 61, at 358-59. 
 73. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188. 
 74. See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 556 (Tex. 1995); 
see also Regnier, supra note 59, at 495. 
 75. For additional discussion on why Daubert should apply, see Beecher-Monas, supra 
note 61, at 360-85; see also Lisa M. Dennis, Note, Constitutionality, Accuracy, Admissibil-
ity: Assessing Expert Predictions of Future Violence in Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 10 
VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 292, 312-14 (2002). 
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D.   Future Dangerousness Now 
 Future dangerousness has marched ahead despite the Daubert 
uncertainty, court confusion,76 scholarly criticism,77 and professional 
condemnation.78 Although some states, such as Mississippi, do not 
permit a consideration of future dangerousness,79 three states—
Oregon, Texas, and Virginia–expressly require a finding of future dan-
gerousness before imposing a sentence of execution.80 Twenty-one ad-
ditional states use future dangerousness as an aggravating factor.81
 States are not alone in this consideration; juries almost always 
consider whether a given defendant will pose a continuing threat to 
society, even if the prosecutor neither introduces evidence on nor 
says anything about future dangerousness.82 Furthermore, jury con-
sideration of future dangerousness is not in passing; in determining 
what sentence to impose, jurors spend more time discussing future 
dangerousness than any other factor save the facts of the crime.83 As 
the debate among both mental health professionals and legal schol-
ars illustrates, future dangerousness is an issue that is ripe for Su-
preme Court review. 
V.   THE PERMISSIBILITY OF FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS 
 The use of mental health professional testimony regarding future 
dangerousness invokes several important constitutional questions. 
In the last few decades, it has become increasingly clear that the 
science behind some future dangerousness predictions is generally 
problematic.84 Why, then, has it been permitted to remain in the 
judicial system?  
 Courts may have thus far refused to exclude mental health pro-
fessional testimony because they believed that future dangerousness 
is a valuable consideration in criminal sentencing and that psycholo-
gists and psychiatrists seemed the best equipped to testify about it.85 
 
 76. See supra Part III.A. 
 77. See, e.g., La Fontaine, supra note 62, at 238-43. 
 78. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 899-903 (1983) (referring to the APA’s 
amicus brief condemning judicial reliability on psychiatric testimony in future dangerous-
ness considerations). 
 79. See Balfour v. State, 598 So.2d 731, 748 (Miss. 1992). 
 80. See OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150 (2007); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 § 
2(e)(1) (Vernon 2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4 (2007). 
 81. Claussen-Schulz et al., supra note 8, at 479. For a partial list of states, see id. at 
479 n.48. 
 82. See John H. Blume et al., Future Dangerousness in Capital Cases: Always “At Is-
sue,” 86 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 398-99 (2001). 
 83. Id. at 404. 
 84. At least this is the case for unstructured clinical assessment. See Monahan, supra 
note 10, at 394. 
 85. The Supreme Court in Barefoot implied a similar position when it said that “it 
makes little sense, if any, to submit that psychiatrists, out of the entire universe of persons 
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Casting out the whole lot of expert testimony would deprive a jury 
facing a tough future dangerousness question of the best information 
modern science can furnish. Thus, faced with choosing between 
abandoning a desirable sentencing tool (future dangerousness) and 
relying on unsteady analytical tools (psychological testing), courts 
prefer the latter. 
 However, courts no longer face this dilemma. Instead of discard-
ing all future dangerousness analysis, certain types of future danger-
ousness predictions could be excluded without emptying the judicial 
tool belt of all future dangerousness utilities. For example, courts 
might choose to exclude clinical methods, while allowing actuarial 
tools. This is one potentially viable option. But in excluding clinical 
methods, courts would also surely contemplate the numerous objec-
tions raised against future dangerousness as a whole. This Part col-
lects six such objections advanced by commentators that the courts 
might consider.  
A.   Relevance 
 The argument against future dangerousness stemming from rele-
vance grounds goes something like this: to be relevant in criminal 
sentencing, information must be reliable.86 Death penalty sentencing 
procedures require a heightened level of reliability for information to 
be relevant and thus admissible.87 Since death is a final, irreversible 
punishment, courts strictly require that the jury only use accurate 
information with probative value in making its decision. Given the 
severity and corresponding high standards of capital trials, future dan-
gerousness testimony is too inaccurate to be relied upon and therefore 
has little probative value. It threatens to bias the jury. Thus, future 
dangerousness evidence is problematic and should be excluded.88
 The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that juries should 
receive only accurate information during the sentencing phase of 
death penalty trials.89 In Gregg, the Court stated that “accurate sen-
tencing information is an indispensable prerequisite to a reasoned 
determination of whether a defendant shall live or die.”90 Indeed, 
only a reasoned, noncapricious system is constitutional.91 The rele-
vant question, then, is whether future dangerousness predictions 
 
who might have an opinion on the issue, would know so little about the subject that they 
should not be permitted to testify.” Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 897 (1983).  
 86. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976). 
 87. See id. 
 88. For a version of this argument primarily concerning clinical assessment, see Reg-
nier, supra note 59, at 502-04. 
 89. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190 (1976). 
 90. Id. 
 91. See id. at 188-89. 
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qualify as reliable. 
 Under the Daubert standard, the most accurate answer is that 
many future dangerousness tools meet this requirement, but some do 
not. As discussed supra Part III.A, clinical assessment methods are 
generally problematic. By applying the four considerations in 
Daubert—testability, peer review, the presence of methodological 
standards, and general acceptance—it is clear clinical assessment 
should be excluded.92 First, clinical assessment methods cannot read-
ily be tested. Second, clinical assessment methods cannot be sub-
jected to peer review (and have not been). Third, methodological 
standards do not really exist beyond a clinician-to-clinician basis. 
And fourth, rather than being generally accepted, the profession has 
almost unanimously rejected the use of clinical assessment meth-
ods.93 The relevance argument directed against clinical assessment is 
thus both accurate and commendable. However, the relevance argu-
ment leads to a different conclusion when directed against actuarial 
tools. Consider, for example, the VRAG. 
 The VRAG passes all four of the Daubert factors and should there-
fore not be excluded. It is a testable instrument; it has been validated 
repeatedly by its authors and peers;94 it possesses clear methodologi-
cal standards, including error rates; and it has been generally ac-
cepted in the scientific community.95 Because the VRAG has been 
shown to be accurate and reliable, it is a suitable tool for judicial 
adoption, even in light of the exacting evidentiary standards present 
in death penalty sentencing.  
 The VRAG, however, is only one of several actuarial tools, and a 
separate Daubert inquiry would be required for each prior to use in 
any future dangerousness consideration. There should be no general 
presumption towards the accuracy of actuarial methods; only those 
tools carefully constructed and repeatedly verified are suitable for 
judicial use. As long as each tool is carefully scrutinized by a gate-
keeping judge, actuarially-informed future dangerousness predic-
tions will be relevant, admissible evidence. 
 Finally, even assuming tools like the VRAG meet the Daubert 
standard, some commentators argue that Daubert is not scrutinizing 
enough.96 Daubert is not a perfect test, and it requires the courts to 
undertake a sometimes daunting review of scientific matters. But 
Daubert is a comprehensive review and is the best standard cur-
rently available. This Comment does not suggest Daubert is a judi-
 
 92. See Regnier, supra note 59, at 494. 
 93. See id. at 495. 
 94. See Harris et al., supra note 16.  
 95. See id. 
 96. See Regnier, supra note 59, at 504-05 (arguing that Daubert is too porous to ex-
clude clinical assessment). 
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cial ambrosia. It simply argues that if future dangerousness is to be 
relied upon, it should be analyzed with the best, most comprehensive 
standard available. For now, Daubert is such. 
B.   Individualized Assessment 
 The sentencing process must permit consideration of the “charac-
ter and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the 
particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the 
process of inflicting the penalty of death.”97 The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly recognized this sort of “individualized assessment” as es-
sential in death penalty sentencing.98 However, the Court has not in-
dicated in detail what it means by an “individualized assessment” 
and has never clarified how it pertains to future dangerousness. In 
particular, since several of the methods informing the empirical com-
ponent of a future dangerousness assessment rely on statistics, and 
therefore sample data,99 it is unclear how strictly “individualized” a 
sentencing determination must be.100 The argument against future 
dangerousness based on individualized assessment grounds claims 
that the use of sample data equates to a nonindividualized assess-
ment and thus is prohibited in capital sentencing.101
 Actuarial risk assessment examines the traits of the defendant 
and is clearly concerned with the particular individual before the 
court. It is, after all, that specific defendant’s traits, conduct, and cir-
cumstances that tests like the VRAG are designed to score. However, 
those traits are only meaningful in the context of the actuarial as-
sessment because they statistically relate to other people in the sam-
ple data that informs the test. It is true, in part, that risk assessment 
is not individualized because it explicitly considers the defendant as 
compared to often hundreds of other individuals.102 The same could 
be said, however, for any psychological assessment tool. Even one 
that relies solely on a mental health professional’s intuition could not 
avoid this “collective” consideration, because clinical intuition will 
 
 97. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976). 
 98. See id. at 303-05. But see id. at 321-22 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
individualized assessments are not required).  
 99. Sample data here refers to the data from the participants in a particular test. For 
example, the VRAG collected data from over 600 individuals and conducted statistical 
analysis to identify the most predictive traits those individuals possessed. These predic-
tions come from the sample of 600, but are assumed to apply to the general population (or 
at least to those similar to the sample). Thus, when a defendant is scored on the VRAG, he 
is being compared to the sample used to create it, or the “sample data.” Some commenta-
tors advancing this position refer to it as “population data,” but population data is a term 
of art that refers to data from a sample that is generalized to (theoretically) apply to the 
public.  See QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 5, at 141-47. 
 100. See Claussen-Schulz et al., supra note 8, at 485-90.  
 101. See id. 
 102. The VRAG was formed by analyzing over 600 individuals. See supra Part III.B. 
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likely be based, at least in part, on the given clinician’s prior experi-
ence treating individuals.103 In a strict sense, psychology as a field is 
informed by and based on statistical analysis of sample data of hun-
dreds of thousands of people.  
 The argument against future dangerousness testimony as “collec-
tive” is advanced by Claussen-Schulz, Pearce, and Schopp, although 
their argument primarily concerns reaching dispositive conclusions 
using actuarial methods and does not stretch as far as the debate is 
carried in this Comment.104 Two breeds of this argument are dis-
cussed here: (1) the fallacy of division and (2) the more general ques-
tion of what the Court meant when it required “individualized as-
sessment.” Although the two overlap in their details, each merits a 
separate analysis to evaluate individualized assessment concerns. 
1.   Fallacy of Division 
 A “fallacy of division” is a logical error in which one concludes that 
person X possesses qualities which others in X’s class possess be-
cause X is a member of that class.105 The fallacy of division lends it-
self well to an example: “Heads of state are highly likely to be mar-
ried, the pope is [a] head of state, therefore, the pope is highly likely 
to be married.”106 The pope is determined to likely be married be-
cause he is a member of the “head of state” class, but clearly he is not 
likely to be married. This is a fallacy of division. The terms “trait” 
and “class” can be used interchangeably in this contemplation; the 
Pope’s “head of state” class status could also be called a trait. Ulti-
mately, the fallacy of division is concerned with using one trait or 
class membership to deduce the existence of other traits or class 
memberships.107 Actuarial tools such as the VRAG do not encourage 
dispositive conclusions, but do claim a 100% probability for certain 
score results.108 Realistically, juries facing a claimed-100% probabil-
ity may feel compelled to conclude that future dangerousness exists. 
Thus, the VRAG risks functioning as a dispositive prediction. 
 Future dangerousness assessments initially appear to fall prey to 
the fallacy of division. The VRAG was developed by looking at a class 
(people who were released and had reoffended) and identifying traits 
 
 103. “Collective,” as used here, means that the clinician does not evaluate the individ-
ual in a vacuum and thus the assessment is potentially not sufficiently individualized. 
 104. See Claussen-Schulz et al., supra note 8, at 485-86. 
 105. See id. at 486. See e.g., JAMES WILLIAM LETT, SCIENCE, REASON, AND 
ANTHROPOLOGY 65 (Rowman & Littlefield 1997). 
 106. Claussen-Schulz et al., supra note 8, at 486. 
 107. “[I]t is improper to apply [the results of a sample-based tool] as dispositive in the 
capital sentencing context, because the capital sentencing decision must always be applied 
to the individual who is being sentenced.” Id. 
 108. For the VRAG, the probability of a repeat violent offense reported for category 9 is 
1.00. See supra Part III.B and accompanying table. 
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they possess (those traits most predictive of violence). When later us-
ing the VRAG in an assessment, a defendant who has some number 
of these traits is predicted to belong to a class—that is, the defendant 
is predicted to be violent in the future based on traits he possesses. Is 
this actually a fallacy of division? Probably not. 
 The fallacy of division argument often focuses on simplistic errors, 
such as where a single trait (being a head of state) is used to predict 
membership in a class (being married). Future dangerousness risk 
assessments typically do not commit so obvious an error. The VRAG, 
for instance, uses several traits, scores both plusses and minuses (for 
example, +5 for severe elementary school maladjustment, but -1 if no 
maladjustment),109 and categorizes participants into nine different 
categories with varying probabilities of repeat offending.110 Other 
tools also involve complex consideration of traits. For example, the 
COVR software is adaptive, and the answer to one question alters 
which question is subsequently presented.111 Actuarial tools thus 
rely on multiple traits to make predictions, and this complex 
analysis enables accurate prediction. Since actuarial tools use 
multiple traits to predict class status, they diverge from the typi-
cal fallacy of division example. 
 It is not clear, however, that actuarial risk assessment tools avoid 
the problems raised by the fallacy of division simply because they use 
multiple factors to predict membership in the “future dangerous” 
class. It may be argued that the fallacy of division also applies to 
convoluted logic trees involving multiple traits. For instance, the fol-
lowing trait trends may all exist: heads of states are likely to be mar-
ried, public figures are likely to be married, financially secure indi-
viduals are likely to be married, and males over fifty are likely to be 
married. Using these traits, a “marriage prediction test” on the Pope 
would fail; the Pope possesses all four of these factors, but is not 
married. Predicting that he is married would be a sophisticated fal-
lacy of division, but still a fallacy.  
 But the error is also obvious: our marriage prediction test did not 
take the right factors into consideration. It should have also consid-
ered religious affiliation (and related celibacy) and a whole host of 
other traits and circumstances. If it had, it would have more accu-
rately predicted the Pope’s marital status. The “fallacy” is in the 
test—not necessarily the theory. 
 Actuarial tools are generally created by statistical methods, such 
 
 109. See QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 5, at 283-85, app. A. 
 110. See supra Part III.B and accompanying table. 
 111. See Monahan, supra note 10, at 412. 
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as regression analysis,112 that evaluate several factors and identify 
those with the greatest predictive value.113 The fallacy of division is 
thus increasingly unlikely because actuarial tools are not picking 
random traits, but instead are picking those traits that are most pre-
dictive and using them in tandem. 
 There is also direct conflict between the success of a given as-
sessment tool and the allegation that it falls prey to any fallacy, be-
cause a prediction is only a fallacy if it is wrong.114 If it is an error to 
predict class membership based on a host of traits correlated with 
that class, then the peer-reviewed, repeatedly successful predictions 
of class membership must be explained. Even if fallacies of division 
are possible, the predictive success of future dangerousness tools 
suggests that such tools are not committing this logical error. If the 
thrust of the fallacy of division argument is that actuarial tools will 
simply be mistaken, then the argument should be presented as an at-
tack on accuracy. Certainly inaccurate tools should not be used; the 
VRAG, however, appears to be accurate. 
 Finally, the fallacy of division argument assumes that there are 
no traits that definitively predict class membership—in other words, 
that the equivalent of causation does not exist. If certain classes all 
share a given trait or certain traits always predict membership in a 
class, it would not be erroneous to recognize this predictive link. If, 
for example, all Michigan football fans were actually allergic to buck-
eye nuts, it would not be a fallacy to predict that serving buckeyes to 
Michigan fans would lead to their becoming sick. This hypothetical, 
of course, illustrates actual causation; the nuts are causing the sick-
ness. What the VRAG might capture is effective causation, that is, a 
consistent, overwhelming impact of circumstances. 
 As a matter of theory, it would not be a fallacy to use predictive 
traits that actually caused other traits. Probably no such traits ex-
ist—the traits studied in the VRAG probably do not actually cause 
individuals to commit violent crimes. This Comment does not argue 
that actual causality is real. But what the VRAG and tests like it ask 
is if there could be traits or circumstances that always,115 or nearly 
 
 112. Regression analysis is a statistical tool that identifies the best fit between two sets 
of data. In other words, regression tools analyze the interaction between the two sets of 
data and identify any relationship to each other. By understanding the relationship, re-
gression analysis informs prediction. See e.g., FREDERICK J. GRAVETTER & LARRY B. 
WALLNAW, STATISTICS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 556-69 (5th ed. Wadsworth 2000). 
 113. For example, the VRAG uses approximately fifty factors. See Monahan, supra 
note 10, at 410. 
 114. Of course, individual predictions may be correct by fluke, and so the standard 
must be much higher—of the scale contemplated by peer review and study repetitions. 
 115. “Always” serves an interesting illustrative point here, but in reality, it is very 
unlikely there are any such traits. Perhaps there are traits that nearly always link with 
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always, correctly predict whether a defendant will commit a future 
violent act. If the answer is yes, the fallacy of division is inapplicable. 
As is discussed below, just because a test can predict the mistakes 
someone will make does not mean the person did not choose to make 
the mistakes. While notions of free will suggest that there are no 
traits that “cause” recidivism, if tests like the VRAG can actually 
predict near 100% probabilities116 it is worth contemplating whether 
a certain subset of circumstances has so severe an impact on indi-
viduals that they are driven to violence.117
 In summary, the fallacy of division strain of the individual as-
sessment argument seems to be inapplicable to future dangerous-
ness. Because actuarial tools rely on many traits to predict class 
membership, because such tools rarely function in a dispositive man-
ner, and because some actuarial tools appear able to accurately pre-
dict recidivism, the fallacy of division argument should not prevent 
the use of future dangerousness testimony. 
2.   Individualized Assessment Generally and Discretion 
 The second type of the individualized assessment argument is 
more general and inquires what the Supreme Court meant when it 
required an “individualized assessment” in Lockett v. Ohio,118 Penry 
v. Lynaugh,119 Woodson,120 and Jurek.121 Did it mean that the defen-
dant cannot be compared to others via sample data-based statistics? 
Likely, the Court intended no such application of its individual as-
sessment requirement given the context of the phrase’s use. In each 
case, the Court was largely concerned with the removal of discretion 
by the statutes at issue. But future dangerousness as a whole does 
not involve a removal of discretion, nor does its empirical component, 
risk assessment, prevent juries from exercising discretion in the 
normative component. Risk assessment simply provides a statistical 
prediction of the defendant’s likelihood of recidivism; it aims to give 
the jury more information upon which to exercise its discretion. 
 Does individualized assessment, separate from the fallacy of divi-
sion argument, forbid the use of sample data? Presumably the an-
swer is no, as revealed in part by the discussion supra Part V.B. 
 
classes, but free will, assuming it exists, would dictate that there may be exceptions to 
every “always.” See infra Part V.G. 
 116. Category 9 of the VRAG is associated with a probability of 1.0. Of course, less than 
1% of those the VRAG was based on fell into this category, so it is highly uncertain if such a 
100% chance is accurate. See QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 5, app. A at 240, app. C at 245. 
 117. If nothing else, it would be valuable to direct additional resources to preventing 
such circumstances from occurring. 
 118. 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978). 
 119. 492 U.S. 302, 316-17 (1989). 
 120. 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).  
 121. 428 U.S. 262, 271 (1976). 
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Comparing a defendant to others does not deny him an individual-
ized assessment; rather, it informs that assessment. Arguing that 
the Court’s “individualized assessment” language requires a defen-
dant to be considered in a vacuum is illogical; making any decision 
requires contemplation of other similar decisions. 
 The best way for juries to predict the defendant’s future danger-
ousness is comparison to other situations which jury members have 
experienced. Whether this comparison is on the micro scale (such as 
where a jury member compares the defendant to the member’s own 
life experiences) or on a larger, institutionalized scale (such as actu-
arial methods that factor in hundreds of people) seems immaterial. 
In fact, the latter—actuarial methods with hundreds of people—
seems preferable because, with a larger group of experiences drawn 
from the actuarial data, the jury is more likely to get an accurate re-
sult. But even with a jury relying only on its own experiences, the 
end result is that, in sentencing the defendant, the jury will consider 
experiences that are not “individualized” to the defendant. The abil-
ity to make reasoned comparisons is at the heart of jury discretion. 
Because the use of sample data does not mean the process is “un-
individualized,” and because actuarial tools aid discretion, such tools 
satisfy the individualized assessment requirement. 
C.   Forbidden Factors 
 All risk assessment methods rely on various factors or traits to 
reach a conclusion about future dangerousness. Clinical assessment 
may even rely on such factors, either intuitively or explicitly (as is 
the case with actuarial methods).122 One argument against future 
dangerousness is that it relies on traits that are not judicially per-
missible.123 While a relevance analysis is concerned only with the sci-
entific validity of such traits, this “forbidden factors” analysis consid-
ers whether they are forbidden despite their predictive power. The 
criticisms tend to focus on three factor types: race, gender, and traits 
that do not index blameworthiness. This Comment does not dispute 
that factors such as race and gender are problematic in several obvi-
ous ways, but since many actuarial tools—including the VRAG—do 
not rely on gender or race, the primary objection is to factors that do 
not index blameworthiness. 
 It is important to clarify that the consideration here is not 
whether these factors are useful in risk assessment. Risk assessment 
 
 122. The HCR Checklist, a structured interview, is transparent as to the factors to be 
considered. See CHRISTOPHER D. WEBSTER ET AL., MENTAL HEALTH, LAW, & POL’Y INST., 
HCR-20: ASSESSING RISK FOR VIOLENCE 11 (Version 2) (1995) (cited in Monahan, supra 
note 10, at 410-11 n.77). 
 123. See, e.g., Monahan, supra note 10, at 427-35. 
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tools are based on whatever traits are found to be most predictive, 
and mental health professionals may generally use whatever traits 
they choose. But in the judicial arena, the question is not just the 
scientific utility of factors, but also their legal permissibility. We turn 
now to this concern. 
 Are factors that do not index blame permissible? Suppose that 
there exists a risk assessment tool, a survey perhaps, that predicts 
with 97% accuracy who will commit serious violent acts in the next 
ten years. Now suppose that this same survey uses as one of its pre-
dictive criteria a factor that does not index blameworthiness (a 
“blame-free factor”). A blame-free factor could be any trait that a per-
son possesses but that they are not culpable for possessing, such as 
having blond hair, being under 35, or even liking the colors blue and 
maize. For reasons unknown, working in conjunction with other fac-
tors this blame-free factor is potently predictive. May this survey be 
used in a judicial setting?  
 At least one state supreme court has held that the use of blame-
indexing factors is permissible,124 but it is unclear if blame-free fac-
tors are also permissible traits for future dangerousness analysis. 
Leading commentators on future dangerousness have concluded that 
the use of factors that do not index blameworthiness is improper, 
noting that it seems odd to punish a defendant more harshly because 
of things beyond his control.125 After all, why should a defendant re-
ceive a harsher sentence because his parents separated before he 
reached age sixteen? 
 Technically, the escalation of punishment is not actually tuned 
towards those circumstances beyond the defendant’s control. The 
harsher sentence is imposed because he is likely to be dangerous in 
the future, not because his parents divorced. It is not the event (the 
divorce) that triggers punishment, it is the effect the event has on 
the person –an effect the individual can control.126 This distinction 
may seem narrow, but it is essential; we return to it in discussing 
 
 124. Joseph v. Commonwealth, 452 S.E.2d 862, 865 (Va. 1995) (considering prior 
crimes in future dangerousness determinations as not a violation of double jeopardy).  
 125. See, e.g., Monahan, supra note 10, at 427-28. (“Retribution deeply colors the im-
plementation of all sentencing schemes, including those whose avowed goals include crime 
control. . . . Given this state of affairs, the use of violence risk factors in sentencing . . . 
should be limited to those that index the extent or seriousness of the defendant’s prior 
criminal conduct.”).  
 126. The immediate question, then, is if they can control it, how can an actuarial tool 
accurately predict future dangerousness? This question is addressed more in later portions 
of this Comment, but for now, the briefest answer is actuarial tools predict what will 
probably happen based on a host of events. A related question is why is the effect of a 
blame-free event a legitimate tool? Again, the shortest answer is that society seems to 
assume that a person is the master of his or her own response to even horrible events. 
However, such events would likely also have a place, as discussed infra, in mitigating 
evidence considerations.  
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free will infra. Nevertheless, it is hard to escape the reality that fac-
tors beyond the defendant’s control are leading to a harsher sentence, 
perhaps even execution. 
 But if future dangerousness itself is constitutionally permissible, 
blame-free factors should be as well. The argument against future 
dangerousness’ reliance on blame-free factors is that events that do 
not index blame cannot be used to punish. But future dangerousness 
itself does not index blame; no matter how it is determined, future 
dangerousness is intended to punish on the basis of the defendant’s 
future, a future that is blame-free until it occurs.127 When a jury sen-
tences a defendant to death in part for the danger he poses in the fu-
ture, it is punishing him for something he has never done, something 
for which he has not accrued any blame. If the use of future danger-
ousness is permissible to punish for the blame-free future, reliance on 
blame-free factors should also be permissible for the same reasons. 
 Perhaps future dangerousness’ blame-free basis is acceptable—
either actually permissible or justified by its usefulness—but we still 
wish only to predict using blameworthy factors. Following this pref-
erence may be very costly to the predictive ability of actuarial tools. 
The VRAG, for example, relies on several factors that do not index 
blame, including separation from biological parents, age, presence of 
a personality disorder, and presence of schizophrenia. The VRAG 
also uses factors that involve the defendant’s choices but may not in-
volve blame, such as elementary school maladjustment (including at-
tendance problems), history of alcohol problems (including parental 
alcoholism), and marital status. The VRAG, which was created by 
identifying the best predictors out of several dozen, would be severely 
undermined by a requirement that only blameworthy factors be used. 
 The objection that the blame-free basis of future dangerousness is 
permissible but the use blame-free factors is not is thus an argument 
that such factors should not be used, rather than that they may not 
be used. If there is no judicial prohibition against using future dan-
gerousness, there should not be a prohibition against using its 
blame-free factors. Even if the use of blame-free factors is undesir-
able, because there is no prohibition against their use and the reli-
ability of the determination (and therefore its admissibility) thus far 
depends upon them, the judiciary should still permit them.  
 If, however, blame-indexing factors are equally or more predictive, 
it remains a reasonable preference that only blame-indexing factors 
 
 127. Or is it? Is there blame to be attached for acts that have not, but objectively will, 
occur? If I drop your favorite vase towards the floor, is it not blameworthy until it reaches 
the floor sometime in the future? If I drop it from the top of the Empire State building, are 
you prohibited from scolding me for breaking it until it actually breaks? There is a chance 
that some event will intercede; I may dive after it, absorb the blow, and die to save the 
vase. May you only scold me for placing your vase in danger of breaking after it falls? 
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be used. The key question, then, is whether actuarial tools using 
blame-indexing factors are as accurate as tools using blame-free fac-
tors. If they are not, since courts do not bar blame-free factors, some-
thing more than a preference will be necessary to justify the use of 
less accurate actuarial tools. Only time and subsequent risk assess-
ment studies will tell if blame-free factors are equally predictive. 
 Despite the inability of statistics to prove causation, the VRAG’s 
blame-free factors are highly predictive, likely because the events 
these factors measure have a great impact on the defendant. Blame-
free factors measure events in the defendant’s life, such as abuse or 
parental separation, which are generally recognized as beyond his 
control. But unless notions of free will are discarded, the effects of 
those events on the defendant are not beyond his control. If free will 
means anything, it is a person’s ability to choose to transcend one’s 
surroundings and become the person he or she wants to be. The pre-
dictive power of blame-free factors remains, despite the existence of 
free will, because presumably people often do not succeed at resisting 
the effects of adverse events, especially when several occur. This is 
certainly an unfortunate fact if true, but it is not one that under-
mines future dangerousness analysis. 
 It is, however, an observation that compels caution. While the 
criminal justice system does not halt before a defendant’s submission 
to powerfully negative influences, it should and does have sympathy 
for the defendant in the contemplation of mitigating factors. When 
given risk assessment results, a jury should be given an instruction 
directing them to consider whether the defendant has escaped the 
negative influences of his past. Defense counsel may argue, using 
whatever character or other mitigating evidence is available, that 
this defendant will not be a future danger because he has escaped 
their influence, or that he is different than the sample population. 
The opportunity to present these and other arguments is protected 
by the requirement that mitigating factors be considered in capital 
sentencing proceedings. These are the sort of adversarial protec-
tions the Supreme Court likely relied on. And they certainly 
should not be overlooked. 
 In summary, given their apparent predictive power and the lack 
of a prohibition, blame-free factors can and should be used. The use 
of blame-indexing factors, however, would be a reasonable alterna-
tive if they create equally accurate predictive tools. Time will tell if 
this is the case. In the interim, any preference for blame-indexing 
factors should give way when blame-free factors are superior predic-
tors, especially in light of the heightened need for accurate tools in 
death penalty sentencing. And given the severity of a death penalty, 
defense lawyers should make certain the jury understands the limits 
of actuarial prediction. 
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D.   Vagueness 
 Vagueness arguments question the specificity of statutes. When a 
statute such as the Texas death penalty statute requires that the 
jury conclude beyond a reasonable doubt there is “a probability” the 
defendant will repeat offend in the future, what does “a probability” 
mean?128 Does this language give juries sufficient guidance in answer-
ing the question? How is “a probability” proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt? These questions are prime examples of the vagueness argument. 
 The Supreme Court has reviewed the “a probability” language and 
declined to condemn it.129 Still, such language is problematic because 
there is a probability of everything. Statistically speaking, there is a 
probability that a thousand monkeys with typewriters will actually 
produce the works of Shakespeare.130 But that probability, while it 
may exist, is very small.131 Still, a jury may feel compelled to answer 
the question in the affirmative, based on the fact that there is some 
possibility that a person will commit a violent act in the future. A 
better approach would be to require the jury to conclude there is a 
“meaningful probability” or “substantial probability” of future vio-
lence or to adopt a percentage level at which it considers the possibil-
ity of recidivism sufficient to conclude a person is a future danger. 
Vagueness arguments correctly suggest that simply requiring a 
finding of “a probability” is problematic and that additional guid-
ance is necessary. The next question is obvious: what level of prob-
ability is sufficient?132  
 If state legislatures hesitate when faced with the question of how 
much risk is enough, a jury will have even more difficulty answering 
the question. Legislatures may assemble dozens of experts and pan-
els, review thousands of pages of findings, and commission studies; 
they have the ability to gather a variety of resources to answer the 
question. Juries have no such power; they may rely only on the evi-
 
 128. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN art. 37.071 (Vernon 2007). 
 129. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 323-24 (1989); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 
272-74 (1976).  
 130. It was once possible to test this theory yourself using the Monkey Shakespeare Simu-
lator, which simulated monkeys banging on keyboards.  See The Monkey Shakespeare Simu-
lator, http://web.archive.org/web/20040603094742/http://user.tninet.se/~ecf599g/aardasnails/  
(last visited Aug. 28, 2007) (archived version of the original website). The record as of De-
cember 4, 2005 (before the original site went down) was reportedly twenty-four letters from 
Henry IV part 2. 
 131. Id. This webpage posits,  
The odds against monkeys typing Shakespeare by chance are astronomical. 
With about 80 typewriter keys, the chance of getting the first letter right is 
about 80 to 1. The chance of getting 2 letters right is 1 in 80×80, or 6400 to 1. 
Each letter increases the odds against by 80 times. The odds of getting 10 let-
ters right is about 11 million million million to 1. 
Id. 
 132. See infra Part VII.A for a discussion on what juries are to do with various percentages. 
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dence presented to them. And while the question for a legislature is 
largely abstract, the decision for a jury is very real. A particular de-
fendant will live or die based on the jury’s answer to the question of 
how much risk is enough. 
 Yet, if a legislature does utilize its resources and statutorily quan-
tifies how much risk is enough, the statute may be struck down for 
denying the jury the required level of discretion. Exactly how much 
discretion is required is generally unknown. But given the constitu-
tional vagueness concerns, legislatures should at least adopt the 
“meaningful probability” or “substantial probability” language, or in-
stead provide specific guidance on what level of risk is appropriate. 
Whatever path a legislature takes, the use of “a probability” alone is 
insufficient, and the question of how much risk is enough is problem-
atic. However, despite the difficulty of the question, it is one which 
the resource-laden legislature should assist in answering. 
E.   Predestination 
 Another argument against the use of future dangerousness is that 
it adopts the principle of predestination.133 If the defendant cannot 
choose a different path, then he lacks free will and is therefore not 
culpable for his actions.134 The argument claims that future danger-
ousness, in asserting a probability that the defendant will commit 
another violent act, denies the existence of his free will and ability to 
choose a different path. The argument continues that, if future dan-
gerousness is going to adopt the deterministic position that the de-
fendant will definitely commit an act in the future, then he is not 
culpable for that act because he did not choose to do it. Therefore, future 
dangerousness proponents should be against punishment of blameless 
defendants based on their predictions (or so the argument goes). 
 This argument confuses predestination with accurate prediction, 
and the difference is vital. Predestination is where an individual has 
no choice, no control over his actions, and will invariably arrive at a 
given destination without deviation. Accurate prediction, on the 
other hand, correctly identifies the destination at which an individ-
ual will arrive, but says nothing about how he will get there. If future 
dangerousness relied on a predestination model, the defendant would 
not be morally culpable because such predictions would assume his 
actions are beyond his control. But that is not reality.135
 
 133. Jurek v. State, 522 S.W.2d 934, 948 n.6 (1975) (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Interestingly, even if events were predestined and no person had control over his 
or her actions, the criminal justice system would likely continue to function. If, by some 
remarkable discovery, it was revealed to all humankind that no one had free will, would 
society simply stop locking up those who murdered, raped, and assaulted? Perhaps. But it 
is more likely that things would continue largely as they do now. After all, the end result—
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 Instead, future dangerousness predicts what destination an indi-
vidual will arrive at of his own volition. When a wife tells her hus-
band to arrive for a 6:30 dinner at 6:15 because she is confident he 
will be late, if he is in fact late, this is not predestination. Instead, it 
is skilled, informed prediction; the wife knows her husband so well 
that she can predict that the sum of his volitional choices will result 
in his being late to dinner. Although future dangerousness concerns 
substantially more severe matters than punctuality, it does the same 
sort of thing: it considers the sum of the defendant’s individual fac-
tors and predicts a result. Depending on the tool’s accuracy, the de-
fendant either will or will not validate that prediction. If he does, it 
will be because the sum of his choices produced the result, not be-
cause future dangerousness tapped into some predestination-
prediction spring. Thus, future dangerousness concerns the defen-
dant’s voluntary choices. 
 Future dangerousness risk assessment acknowledges free will in 
its percentage predictions. While certain traits are predictive, they 
are not always definitive, hence the generally less-than-100%-chance 
predictions. Because risk assessment only uses accurate predictions 
and does not assume predestination, its use is permissible. 
F.   Non-Retributive 
 The United States criminal justice system is based on both utili-
tarian and retributive grounds. Blackstone penned that “punish-
ments are chiefly intended for the prevention of future crimes.”136 
But conversely, Monahan has observed that “[r]etribution deeply col-
ors the implementation of all sentencing schemes, including those 
whose avowed goals include crime control.”137 Whereas most of the 
criminal justice system involves a blend of both utilitarian and re-
tributive objectives, future dangerousness is based primarily on utili-
tarian, preventative grounds. Because future dangerousness contem-
plates an increase in punishment based on an uncommitted act, the 
nonretributive argument claims that the use of future dangerousness 
is impermissible. The nonretributive argument thus overlaps with 
the forbidden factor, blame-free traits, and predestination arguments 
previously discussed. An iconic representation of this argument is 
the following statement: “Your past crimes have earned you at least 
life in prison. [Your future dangerousness may earn you death].”138  
 
either continue sentencing criminals or stop sentencing criminals—would be predeter-
mined. If society were to continue sentencing criminals, then those predestined to be de-
terred would paradoxically require the existence of a deterrent mechanism—the continua-
tion of sentencing. Such speculation quickly devolves into convoluted, abstract questions. 
 136. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *16. 
 137. Monahan, supra note 10, at 427-28. 
 138. Regnier, supra note 59, at 476. 
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 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines are “theoretically agnostic 
about why we punish.”139 The Supreme Court thus far has indicated 
that the preventive emphasis is permissible; even when the escala-
tion of punishment has arguably hinged on future dangerousness 
considerations, the death penalty statute at issue was upheld.140 
More generally, faced with a defendant who has made blatant 
threats and credible indications that he will kill or rape if released, 
the criminal justice system is pressed to find some way to preven-
tively detain him.  
 The non-retributive argument fails, however, for three reasons.  
First, to the extent it claims that future dangerousness’ premises are 
simply improper, prior sections of this Comment and the preventa-
tive aspect of punishment undermine it. Second, the argument is in-
complete: the statement “it is improper to punish based on non-
retributive future dangerousness” is a conclusion without a premise. 
Again, the premises that would seem to most often accompany this 
argument were discussed earlier in this Part.141 Third, many long-
accepted procedures in the criminal justice system contemplate 
events which have not yet occurred. Bail considerations contemplate 
the future risk of flight, and if the tribunal determines there is a suf-
ficient probability the defendant will flee, bail may be set astronomi-
cally high or denied entirely.142 Parole and probation also contem-
plate future dangerousness.143 For these three reasons, the non-
retributive argument does not preclude use of future dangerousness. 
 Still, if the first two reasons were to be proven false, could the 
non-retributive argument be rejected solely on the grounds that 
other accepted aspects of the criminal justice system use future dan-
gerousness (bail, parole, and probation)? Perhaps. The rationale that 
future dangerousness is permissible for capital sentencing because 
other areas of the criminal justice system rely on it is a sort of stage 
magician maneuver; it moves to justify a controversial practice sim-
ply by pointing to other procedures that also use it. A fair response to 
this argument is that future dangerousness is an inappropriate tool 
in all uses, it just hasn’t been criticized as much for bail, parole, and 
probation uses. But again, this is a conclusion without a premise. If 
future dangerousness cannot be used, what is the reason?  
 
 139. Monahan, supra note 10, at 397. 
 140. See Regnier, supra note 59, at 478-80 (discussing the Court’s upholding of the 
Texas death penalty statute in Jurek despite the question of execution turning on future 
dangerousness considerations). 
 141. Those premises that immediately come to mind being (1) it is improper because 
the American system of justice is purely retributive, (2) it is improper because a non-
retributive approach uses “blame-free” or other forbidden factors, or (3) it is improper be-
cause non-retributive factors are unreliable. Each of these has already been addressed. 
 142. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 275 (1976). 
 143. Id. 
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 Pragmatically, this retort that all uses of future dangerousness 
are inappropriate would also be an uphill battle. Judicial predictions 
about the future dangers posed by a defendant have long been a part 
of the justice system. The system is rooted in such preventative 
grounds, and sweeping change is unlikely. As long as the utilitarian 
basis of the criminal justice system persists, future dangerousness 
assessments, as a means to directly or indirectly detain dangerous 
persons, are unlikely to disappear.144  
 It is certainly true, however, that at least two key differences 
separate bail, parole, and probation uses of future dangerousness 
from its use in capital sentencing: mitigation and severity. Each mer-
its some discussion. 
1.   Mitigation Versus Escalation 
 The first difference is that bail, parole, and probation all involve 
considering a future event in order to mitigate a sentence, not esca-
late it. They are a type of exception—a forgiveness, almost—for an 
alleged or proven wrong. Thus, the aforementioned iconic statement 
is reversed in these examples: “Your crimes have earned you a harsh 
outcome (e.g. two more years in jail, a $50,000 bail, or a one-year 
sentence); your future acts mitigate it (e.g. release you on parole two 
years early, earn you a $10,000 bail, or earn you one year of proba-
tion, respectively).” 
 May future dangerousness be relied upon to mitigate, but not re-
lied upon to escalate? If so, the functional effect of this argument 
against future dangerousness as nonretributive would seem to be re-
duced to semantics. Whether used to escalate or mitigate, the analy-
sis turns on the existence of future dangerousness. 
 For example, what if state legislatures simply reworded their 
statutes to adhere to the following mitigation framework: “If a defen-
dant is not a future danger, the defendant shall be sentenced to life.” 
The statute would function nearly identically to death penalty stat-
utes that require future dangerousness as a condition precedent to 
the death penalty, as a finding of no future dangerousness in either 
case would require a sentence of life in prison, rather than death. It 
would also likely pass constitutional muster because it would allow 
for jury discretion. The end result, however, is that whether used to 
escalate or mitigate, future dangerousness would hold a final say, 
thereby revealing that a mitigation vs. escalation argument is form 
without substance. Just like the overarching nonretributive argu-
 
 144. However, its continued existence does not dictate that its continued criminal ap-
plication persist. Instead, civil commitment or other statutory schemes might suffice. For a 
discussion touching application in other contexts, see Christopher Slobogin, A Jurispru-
dence of Dangerousness, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 58-62 (2003). 
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ment is incomplete (it is a conclusion without a premise), so too is a 
distinction based on escalation as opposed to mitigation.  
 If states did employ this death penalty framework, would it allow 
a constitutionally permissible level of discretion? The Supreme Court 
could answer this question in either direction. In Woodson, the Court 
struck down the mandatory North Carolina statute,145 but in Jurek 
the Court upheld a Texas statute which essentially confined discre-
tion to the question of future dangerousness.146 A death penalty stat-
ute like the above example is more like the Jurek statute than the 
Woodson statute. Given that the Court upheld the Jurek statute even 
though its discretion was minimal, a statute that allows for discre-
tion to mitigate a death sentence would presumably be permitted. 
2.   Greater Versus Lesser Severity 
 Capital sentencing involves a much more severe penalty than a 
high bail, denial of parole, or long probation. Looking ahead at events 
that are unknown may involve the same probability of success in 
bail, parole, probation, and capital sentencing situations, but the cost 
of error is much greater in capital sentencing. This difference im-
pacts the issue of reliability, and thus admissibility. The argument 
implies that future dangerousness evidence may be sufficiently accu-
rate for bail, parole, and probation considerations, but that it is not 
accurate enough for a matter as serious as capital sentencing. Differ-
ing evidentiary requirements respond to this concern and undercut 
the Greater vs. Lesser Severity argument. 
 Judicial gatekeeping, via standards such as those outlined in 
Daubert, is designed to screen unreliable evidence from the jury’s 
consideration. Bail, parole, probation, and capital sentencing deci-
sions each involve different costs in the event of error, and thus capi-
tal sentencing should adhere to exacting admissibility standards. 
Daubert offers a gatekeeping judge an opportunity to carefully review 
the future dangerousness tool at issue and, if it is insufficiently reli-
able, it can (and should) be excluded.  The Greater vs. Lesser Sever-
ity argument thus correctly identifies that death penalty use of fu-
ture dangerousness requires increased reliability and evidentiary 
standards. It does not, however, dictate that future dangerousness as 
a sentencing tool should be discarded. 
G.   Summary 
 Actuarial risk assessment is reliable and relevant to the difficult 
question of future dangerousness which many statutes present to ju-
 
 145. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 286 (1976). 
 146. See Jurek, 428 U.S. at 269. 
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ries. While actuarial tools rely on statistics, this does not result in a 
lack of discretion or a “nonindividualized” assessment. Most tools do 
not rely on forbidden factors such as race and gender, and those that 
rely on blame-free factors are permissible since future dangerousness 
itself contemplates the blame-free future. Future dangerousness does 
not adopt the concept of predestination, and its nonretributive basis 
is not discordant with the foundations of the United States justice 
system. Finally, statutes that do not specify what “a probability” of 
future dangerousness means are problematic and should be avoided 
as too vague. Future dangerousness informed by risk assessment is 
permissible and may be used by courts. 
VI.   GENERAL AND SPECIFIC SUPPORT FOR FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS 
 If future dangerousness requires the defenses set forth at length 
in the prior portions of this Comment, it begs the question “why 
should courts bother with such a tool?” This Part attempts to answer 
such an inquiry and begins by considering reasons why future dan-
gerousness is useful as a general principle. It then considers some 
specific examples from the literature on future dangerousness and 
discusses more specifically why the use of future dangerousness in 
the judicial system is desirable. 
A.    General Reasons to Keep Future Dangerousness 
 One reason the courts should continue to allow future dangerous-
ness testimony is because most rules of evidence provide for the ad-
missibility of all relevant information for the jury to consider.147 Ac-
cording to studies, a jury will consider the implications of future 
dangerousness even if the issue does not come up at trial.148 There-
fore, accurate information that helps juries address such considera-
tions is certainly relevant. Actuarial results are easy to comprehend 
and offer valuable insights to juries. Since the jury will likely make a 
future dangerousness determination whether asked to or not, they 
should be given the best tools available to make that determination. 
 As the American Bar Association has noted, if juries are going to 
consider future dangerousness, risk assessment by mental health 
professionals is the best means of evidence available.149 While some 
methods, such as the clinical assessments discussed supra Part III.A, 
are unreliable, the social and mental health sciences continue to 
 
 147. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 148. See Blume et al., supra note 82, at 398-99. 
 149. JOHN W. PARRY, NATIONAL BENCHBOOK ON PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL 
EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY 49 (1998). 
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work to improve risk assessment tools.150 Certainly, for states that 
require juries to consider the defendant’s future dangerousness, it is 
reasonable that juries be given the best information modern science 
and technology have to offer. The adversarial process, gatekeeping 
judges, and careful instructions to the jury will help to reduce what-
ever limitations the particular assessment instrument might have. 
So long as the risk assessment tool is reliable, its results should be 
available to juries. 
 Another reason to keep future dangerousness is the odd paradox 
that would result from discarding it. Assume, arguendo, that one of 
the above-mentioned arguments against the use of future danger-
ousness risk assessments is valid, such that the State could no longer 
use future dangerousness evidence. Could the defendants neverthe-
less use such evidence if it would aid his defense? If, for instance, the 
defendant scores in the lower categories on several major actuarial 
tools, indicating he is unlikely to be a future danger, it may greatly 
aid his case to present this evidence. The defendant potentially faces 
execution, and part of the purpose of allowing a broad range of in-
formation into evidence during sentencing is to give the defendant a 
full and meaningful chance to present his case. The defendant would 
therefore likely be permitted to introduce future dangerousness evi-
dence even despite whatever argument above prevailed over the use 
of future dangerousness evidence generally. 
 But if the State could not do the same, this would create an odd 
paradox where the defense could introduce evidence that the State 
could not rebut with its own findings. Ultimately, this would lead to 
an inequality in criminal proceedings. Thus, another reason to admit 
future dangerousness evidence is that denying its availability to the 
State would likely create an inequality in capital sentencing, a gen-
erally undesirable event.  
 In summary, future dangerousness risk assessment is a valuable 
tool because it addresses a question that is both hard to answer and 
that juries essentially always consider, even if not asked to. Future 
dangerousness addresses a question that is of obvious importance in 
sentencing defendants – will he or she be a danger to others, such as 
guards, fellow inmates, or even the public should the defendant es-
cape? While the use of future dangerousness risk assessment re-
quires answering many complex and difficult questions, provided 
those questions can be answered satisfactorily, future dangerousness 
remains a valid judicial tool.  
 
 150. For an example of such an ongoing research project with the VRAG, see, e.g., Research 
Risk Assessment Page, www.mhcp-research.com/ragpage.htm (last visited Aug. 27, 2007). 
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B.   Specific Examples: Three Future Dangerousness Candidates 
 Perhaps the best reason to keep future dangerousness as an ana-
lytical tool is revealed by viewing it in action. It is thus worth de-
scribing some real future dangerousness candidates, as described by 
fellow commentators.151 Consider the following individuals, both in 
terms of preventative detention future dangerousness uses and its 
use in death penalty sentencing: 
  Garry David is about to be released from prison after serving 
fourteen years for shooting a woman and two police officers.152 He 
has been diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder, a disorder 
that often leads to violent and dangerous behavioral outbursts.153 
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth 
Edition (DSM-IV), describes the disorder as follows:  
As an adult, the person often commits acts that are against the 
law and/or fails to live up to the requirements of a job, financial re-
sponsibility, or parenting responsibilities. [Such persons] fre-
quently are involved in alcohol and drug abuse. 
. . . . 
 Currently, there is no widely accepted effective method of treat-
ing sociopathic personality types. They tend to be very manipulat-
ive during treatment and tend to lie and cover up personal faults 
in themselves and have little insight into their behavior pat-
terns.154
A tribunal has also specifically determined that Garry is “likely to be 
violent if released.”155  
 Leroy Hendricks is about to be released after serving time for his 
fifth child molestation.156 He has stated expressly that the only sure 
way to stop him from molesting children is for him “to die.”157 Leroy 
has testified before a judge and jury, confessing he has “repeatedly 
abused children whenever he was not confined.”158 He told his treat-
ing physician, who diagnosed him with pedophilia, that “treatment is 
bull----”159 and that when he “get[s] stressed out” he “can’t control the 
 
 151. Some of the situations described infra have been previously discussed by scholars 
and have been modified for their inclusion here. See, e.g., Slobogin, supra note 144, at 1. 
 152. Id. at 1 (citing C.R. Williams, Psychopathy, Mental Illness and Preventive Detention: 
Issues Arising from the David Case, 16 MONASH UNIV. L. REV. 161, 162, 170-78 (1990)). 
 153. Id. 
 154. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS (DSM-IV-TR) § 301.70 (4th ed. text revision 2000), available at 
http://www.accg.net/antisocial.htm. 
 155. Slobogin, supra note 144, at 1 (citing Williams, supra note 152). 
 156. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
 157. Id. at 2078; see also Slobogin, supra note 144, at 1.  
 158. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 2078. 
 159. Id. at 2079. 
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urge [to molest children].”160
 John Coker was convicted and sentenced to three life terms for 
two rapes, a murder, and other crimes.161 John escaped from prison 
just two years after being incarcerated, and before being recaptured 
he raped another victim.162 He told another victim he encountered, 
“[I] don’t have nothing to lose—[I am in] prison for the rest of [my] 
life, anyway.”163 He has since been reapprehended.164
 Now imagine Garry, Leroy, and John are before a tribunal. Should 
it be able to preventatively detain any of them? What about if they 
commit some other crime and the death penalty is on the table (as it 
likely already is for John Coker)? Could the State use future danger-
ousness evidence against them?  
 What if Garry later commits another crime and the following fic-
tional facts are added to the equation: when he was last in a super-
maximum-security prison, he assaulted forty-seven guards, nearly 
killing twelve, and almost escaped twice. Should the tribunal be pre-
vented from considering the danger he poses to the guards if sent 
back, or to the public if he escapes?  
 Faced with reliable evidence that an individual is likely to commit 
a crime in the future, a tribunal should be able to act to prevent the 
potential harm. The justice system, as noted earlier, was partially 
developed on preventative grounds.165 The difficulty arises in defin-
ing what constitutes “reliable evidence.” But this is a reason to set 
exacting evidence standards, not to completely forbid future danger-
ousness as an evidentiary tool. Future dangerousness is a highly use-
ful component of criminal sentencing because it allows the judge and 
jury to consider all options for defendants serving a life sentence who 
feel they have “nothing to lose.” And this is only one of its uses. As 
such, it is a not a tool courts should discard. 
VII.   A FUTURE FOR FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS SANS DR. DEATH 
 Future dangerousness is a useful tool, but not yet a perfect tool. 
As such, controls to minimize risk should be continuously enhanced. 
Several restrictions and prohibitions should be followed to ensure 
fairness and minimize abuse. This Part thus contemplates develop-
ments that might aid in creating a more-ideal future dangerousness 
schematic. As with the real defendants discussed above, it begins 
 
 160. Id. at 2078. 
 161. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); see also JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 70 (3d ed. 2003). 
 162. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 n.4. 
 163. Id.; see also DRESSLER, supra note 161, at 70. 
 164. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 n.4. 
 165. See supra Part VI.F.2. 
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with a real future dangerousness “expert.” 
 Dr. Grigson, one of the experts who testified in Barefoot, has been 
dubbed “Dr. Death.”166 Before his recent retirement, Grigson testified 
in over 140 capital cases for the State of Texas.167 He often testified it 
was “a matter of medical certainty”168 that the defendant would re-
peat offend, and sometimes even asserted such as a “one thousand 
percent chance.”169 Despite being expelled from the American Psy-
chiatry Association and the Texas Association of Psychiatrists, he 
continued to be a star witness for Texas.170 Even in the face of DNA 
evidence proving that one of the individuals he testified was certain 
to reoffend was actually innocent, Dr. Grigson has maintained that 
his testimony was accurate.171
 Despite the merits of future dangerousness analysis, the example 
of Dr. Grigson’s testimony compels careful consideration of how the 
tribunal decides to act when presented with risk assessment evi-
dence.172 Though Dr. Grigson has retired, the world is likely full of 
similarly motivated Grigson clones that may persuade judges and ju-
ries that the future is certain to better if the defendant is locked up 
or executed.173 It is only through stringent controls that such abuse 
can be minimized. We turn now to such controls. 
A.   Improving Future Dangerousness Considerations 
 When experts testify, juries give great weight to their opinions.174 
Thus, if an expert gives misleading or inaccurate testimony, jury 
members may disregard the accurate opinions they themselves had 
developed. Since the court has bestowed the testimony with the “ex-
pert witness” title, jury members may assume that any disagree-
ments between what the expert thinks and what the jury member 
thinks should be resolved in favor of the expert. This is not necessar-
 
 166. Regnier, supra note 59, at 481; see also Jeralyn Meritt, Texas: ‘Dr. Death’ Retires, 
TALKLEFT (Dec. 21, 2003), http://talkleft.com/new_archives/004754.html. 
 167. Regnier, supra note 59, at 481. 
 168. Id. 
 169. TEX. DEFENDER SERV., A STATE OF DENIAL: TEXAS JUSTICE AND THE DEATH 
PENALTY 30 (as modified May 22, 2003), available at http://www.texasdefender.org/state% 
20of%20denial/Chap3.pdf. 
 170. Regnier, supra note 59, at 482. 
 171. Id. at 481. Interestingly, this stubbornness itself reveals a flaw. Since he made his 
future dangerousness predictions based on hypothetical fact scenarios that involved the 
description of the crime the defendant was being charged with, if the defendant did not 
commit the crime alleged, Grigson’s prediction stands on nothing but air. That Grigson 
would support such a prediction, founded on nothing at all, is highly indicative of the 
worth of his testimony generally. 
 172. See supra Part VI.B. 
 173. See Regnier, supra note 59, at 482.  
 174. Fontaine, supra note 62, at 230; see also White v. Estelle, 554 F. Supp. 851, 858 
(S.D. Tex. 1982) (explaining that when a future dangerousness opinion is offered by an ex-
pert witness, such as a doctor, it has an “much greater” impact on the jury). 
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ily problematic when the expert testimony is accurate, but when an 
expert’s inaccurate testimony or “junk science” is given dispositive 
weight, there is a serious problem. It is also problematic if the ex-
pert’s views are adopted in areas where the jury is to do the deciding, 
such as normative considerations. 
 To avoid this, courts must stringently adhere to standards like 
those in Daubert. Under the Daubert analysis, “general acceptance” 
and “peer reviewed” must never be reduced to asking “are there a lot 
of articles on this topic?” Methodological standard inquiries should 
consider the validity of those methods as they pertain to the goal of 
the technique.  
 Daubert should also not be presumed to be an endpoint in future 
dangerousness evidence admissibility standards. Commentators from 
both scientific and legal fields should continue to contemplate what a 
better standard might be. All the utility of future dangerousness is 
corrupted whenever the Dr. Deaths of the world are permitted to tes-
tify to “a one thousand percent [medical certainty].”175
 Experts must be screened carefully to avoid misleading the jury, 
and they should also be advised to communicate their findings within 
certain confines. This Comment supports the view that mental 
health professionals must not be permitted to testify as to the norma-
tive aspect of the jury’s future dangerousness inquiry.176 Mental 
health professionals are no more qualified than any jury member to 
conclude what level of risk is enough to determine there is a “prob-
ability” of future danger. Given the weight such expert opinion is 
usually accorded, allowing an expert to opine on the normative as-
pect of the question severely limits the discretion jury members may 
exercise. Perhaps some field of experts has a series of qualifications 
that enables them to offer such advice. However, psychologists, psy-
chiatrists, FBI agents, and other mental health professional do not 
intrinsically have such expertise.  
 Along with the substantive control of communication, experts 
should also carefully consider how they communicate permissible in-
formation to the jury. Monahan and Steadman compare future dan-
gerousness predictions to weather forecasts: “Forecasts possess no in-
trinsic value . . . [but] acquire value through their ability to influence 
the decisions made by users of the forecasts.”177 Juries must decide 
what percentage risk is enough to conclude that there is “a probabil-
ity” of future dangerousness. Because a mental health professional 
 
 175. TEX. DEFENDER SERV., supra note 169, at 30. 
 176. See Claussen-Schulz et al., supra note 8, at 487-90.  
 177. Monahan & Steadman, supra note 7, at 937 (quoting Allen H. Murphy, What Is a 
Good Forecast? An Essay on the Nature of Goodness in Weather Forecasting, 8 WEATHER & 
FORECASTING, 281, 286 (1993)). 
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cannot offer advice on how to consider the probability of recidivism in 
a normative context, she should be careful about how she presents 
evidence to the jury. Adverbs, adjectives, emphasis, and intonation 
will pose the greatest threat, as a 62% chance of recidivism sounds 
very different when presented as “he has only a 62% chance” versus 
“he has a high 62% chance” or even “he has a 62% chance!” These 
sorts of simple mistakes can have a large impact on a jury weighing 
execution. Only by reducing the expert’s testimony to a recitation of 
scientific facts may these mistakes be avoided. 
 Juries may also be confused if they are presented with all of the 
data an actuarial tool returns but provided no further guidance. For 
example, while the sophisticated COVR software indicates that an 
individual in the highest risk category has a 76% change of recidi-
vism, juries may be inappropriately persuaded by the fact that this is 
the highest risk category on the measure. Upon hearing that the de-
fendant has a 76% chance, the jury may be inclined to think that 
76% is too low to execute him. But when they learn that 76% is the 
highest percentage that the actuarial tool returns, they may feel 
compelled to choose death. Thus, juries should be instructed that the 
category the defendant falls into is only part of their analysis, not the 
end of the future dangerousness consideration. 
 Indeed, even if studies claim probability levels of 100%, such as 
the VRAG’s category 9,178 that should not be the end of the jury’s 
normative contemplation. Juries should still examine the actuarial 
instrument used, its applicability to this individual (as compared to 
its sample population), and any other mitigating factors. Judges 
should instruct juries to consider each of these. To avoid confusion, 
juries should only be given information with probative value that ex-
ceeds its prejudicial effect. Some evidence, such as that a given per-
centage is the tests’ highest category, may well be more prejudicial 
than probative. 
 To address jury confusion, judges should be careful to instruct 
jury members thoughtfully and to answer questions they pose. It 
takes a fair deal of nerve to ask a judge a question, and if a jury does 
inquire, it probably indicates that there is something meaningful per-
plexing them. Judges should respond carefully and thoughtfully. 
Judges are a last line of defense to a confused jury –questions they 
pose should not be taken lightly or ignored. 
 One such area of jury confusion is length of sentences. Juries are 
often confused in capital considerations and assume that if the de-
fendant is sentenced to life, rather than death, he will be eligible for 
 
 178. QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 5, app. B at 240, app. C at 245. 
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parole.179 Juries also tend to underestimate the length of a life prison 
sentence dramatically.180 In one study of jurors from actual capital 
cases in South Carolina, the median juror prediction was that a life 
sentence meant seventeen years in jail.181 In reality, in the cases the 
study involved, the life sentence would have actually meant life in 
prison, as the defendants were ineligible for parole.182 While such 
jury mistakes have ramifications for all criminal sentencing involv-
ing life imprisonment and the possibility of parole, they have an es-
pecially potent impact on future dangerousness considerations. 
Judges should consider instructing the jury to avoid such confusion. 
 In the same vein of fairness to the defendant, courts must allow 
defendants faced with future dangerousness evidence to access ex-
pert witnesses of their own, even if they cannot afford it. By making 
qualified mental health professionals available for consultation, the 
court protects the defendant’s rights. The Supreme Court in Barefoot 
relied on the adversarial system to sort out the accuracy of expert 
witness testimony.183 But if the defendant is unable to fully utilize 
that system, the Court’s rationale fails disastrously. 
 This principle was recognized in Ake v. Oklahoma,184 though it 
has been somewhat restricted since that decision.185 The indigent de-
fendant is just as entitled as any other defendant to the protections 
the adversarial system affords in future dangerousness cases. To 
deny the defendant such protections is to remove one of the funda-
mental bases on which the Court decided to allow future dangerous-
ness testimony. The loss of these protections would seem to compel the 
conclusion that future dangerousness testimony is not permissible in 
situations where the defendant cannot fully use the adversarial sys-
tem.186  
VIII.   CONCLUSION 
 While future dangerousness is permissible in capital sentencing, 
 
 179. See Blume et al., supra note 82, at 397-402 (discussing Shafer v. South Carolina, 
121 S. Ct. 30 (2000), where the jury was confused about the defendant’s ineligibility for pa-
role and subsequent sentence of death). 
 180. Id. at 404. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 901 (1983). 
 184. 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (holding that due process requires that the defendant have ac-
cess to mental health evaluation in cases involving future dangerousness determinations). 
 185. See Dennis, supra note 75, at 298-99 (discussing how decisions since Ake have 
narrowed the defendant’s access to counsel). The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals now 
requires the defendant to show “a reasonable probability that the expert would be of assis-
tance to the defense and that the denial of an expert would result in a fundamentally un-
fair trial.” Id. at 299 (citing Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702, 712 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc)).  
 186. For additional discussion on future dangerousness and the adversarial system, 
see Regnier, supra note 59, at 379-80. 
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several important precautions must be heeded. Evidence must be 
presented clearly and restricted to empirical, nonnormative state-
ments. Judges must be diligent gatekeepers and also be sensitive to 
jury misunderstandings that may prejudice either party. Daubert 
must be applied carefully and accurately. The Supreme Court upheld 
the use of future dangerousness largely based on its belief in the re-
liability of the judicial process to protect individual rights. In capital 
sentencing, rights trampled on may not necessarily be revived later. 
Death is, after all, irreversible. Future dangerousness use would be in-
creasingly justified if the improvements detailed herein were adopted. 
 Finally, it is worth remembering that future dangerousness con-
siderations occur squarely at the crossroads of psychology and law. 
The result is that literature on the topic comes from psychologists, 
lawyers, judges, psychiatrists, law and psychology students, and 
countless other professionals. Commentators should always strive for 
clarity in making suggestions, and while certain familiarity with the 
lexicon may be assumed, explanations via footnote are rarely unwel-
come. By doing so, commentators help encourage new entrants who 
may have valuable insights to offer into the discussion. Given the se-
verity of the discussion topic, and the consequences of error, the more 
thoughtful commentators the better. 
 
